No tradition has had a more volatile relationship with the state that claims it. The Qin proscribed it; Emperor Wu of the Han made it official doctrine in the second century BCE and established the imperial academy; it structured the examination and thus the entire governing class for thirteen centuries. Then the twentieth century: the May Fourth Movement of 1919 made da dao Kong jia dian — down with the Confucian shop — a slogan of Chinese modernity, holding the tradition responsible for the family system, the position of women and national weakness; the Cultural Revolution ran the Criticise Lin Biao and Criticise Confucius campaign from 1973, and Red Guards had already sacked the Qufu temple, mansion and cemetery in 1966, smashing stelae and desecrating the graves of the Kong family. Since the early 2000s the same state has restored Qufu, elevated the birthday ceremony to national intangible heritage, named its overseas language institutes after him, and rehabilitated harmony and ritual in official language. The turn is a live subject among Chinese intellectuals, both those who welcome it and those who read it as instrumentalisation.